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NOTE

A Crack in the Floodgates: New York’s Fourth
Department, the PLCAA, and the Future of
Gun Litigation After Williams v. Beemiller
JACOB S. SONNER†
“If the plaintiff wins this case . . . it will open the floodgates of
[gun] litigation. Trial lawyers will go crazy. They’ll bankrupt the
1
[gun industry].”

INTRODUCTION
On October 5, 2012, an appellate court in Rochester,
New York allowed a gunshot victim’s case against the
manufacturers and distributors of the weapon used in his
shooting to proceed past the defendants’ motions to
dismiss.2 The decision contradicted a wealth of judicial
precedent insulating the firearms industry from liability in
cases where third parties criminally used guns. Further, the
decision reopened a door for gun-control-conscious plaintiffs
to enhance public health goals through litigation. This Note
traces the history of one violent crime, a statute protecting
gun manufacturers, a New York court’s interpretation of
both, and a social policy shift that may turn the tide in favor

† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2014, SUNY Buffalo Law School. Thanks to Richard
Schaus, Esq. and Barbara Schaus, Esq. for their advice and guidance, and to my
family for their love and support.
1. JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY 113 (1996). Grisham’s fictional
account of a big tobacco lawsuit directed this warning at the tobacco industry.
Id. In a 2003 cinematic adaptation of the novel, the firearms industry replaced
big tobacco as the threatened defendant. See RUNAWAY JURY (Regency
Enterprises, New Regency Pictures, Epsilon Motion Pictures 2003).
2. Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 952 N.Y.S.2d 333, 333, 335-39 (App. Div. 4th
Dep’t 2012), amended by 962 N.Y.S.2d 834 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013).
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of using the judiciary to impose heightened regulatory
measures on the firearms industry.
Part I chronicles the facts behind Williams v. Beemiller,
including an Ohio gun retailer’s lax standards and a
western New York criminal’s illegal firearm trafficking
scheme. Part II covers Congress’s enactment of the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act and its effects
on lawsuits against the firearm industry. Part III discusses
the Fourth Department’s decision in Williams v. Beemiller
and its reasoning behind the holding. Lastly, Part IV
evaluates Williams v. Beemiller within the context of a
revived gun-control movement.
I. 2003: DANIEL WILLIAMS’ FUTURE IS TRAGICALLY LINKED TO
BEEMILLER, MKS SUPPLY, CHARLES BROWN, JAMES NIGEL
BOSTIC, AND CORNELL CALDWELL
In August 2003, sixteen-year-old Daniel “Bud” Williams
was playing basketball outside his Buffalo, New York home
when eighteen-year-old Cornell Caldwell misidentified the
teen as a rival gang member.3 Caldwell aimed and fired his
Hi-Point 9mm semi-automatic handgun4 at Williams,
piercing his target’s abdomen with a bullet.5 Media and law
3. John Caher, Panel Revives Suit Against Gun Maker and Distributor, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 12, 2012, at 1; Susan Schulman, Court Rules Victim Can Sue Gun
Industry, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 9, 2012, at A1.
4. Frequently used in violent crimes and possessing little collector value, HiPoint 9mm semi-automatic handguns belong to a group of firearms nicknamed
“Saturday Night Specials.” Brian J. Siebel, Gun Industry Immunity: Why the
Gun Industry’s “Dirty Little Secret” Does Not Deserve Congressional Protection,
73 UMKC L. REV. 911, 919 (2005). In 2000, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) surveyed several cities in North Carolina and
found the Hi-Point 9mm semi-automatic pistol was one of the top ten traced
firearms in gun crimes. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS (2000) GREENSBORO/ HIGH
POINT/
WINSTON-SALEM,
N.C.
6
(July
2002),
http://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/ycgii/2000/cityreports/greensboro
nc.pdf. The gun accounted for nearly 33% of gun crimes committed by North
Carolina juveniles under age seventeen, more than any other firearm. Id.
5. See Susan Schulman, Lou Michel & Dan Herbeck, The Damage Done:
Two Buffalo Lives Intertwine as a Gun Trafficker’s Scheme Shoots Down a
Young Athlete’s Dream, BUFFALO NEWS, June 12, 2005, at A1 (in 2005, the
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enforcement investigations eventually discovered that
Caldwell’s pistol arrived on the Buffalo streets courtesy of
an infamous gun trafficking scheme responsible for
supplying hundreds of illegal weapons used in many of the
city’s gun crimes.6
Caldwell’s 9mm was manufactured by Hi-Point
(Beemiller), a.k.a. Beemiller, Inc., a federally licensed
firearms manufacturer incorporated in Ohio.7 Beemiller sold
the semi-automatic handgun to MKS Supply, Inc. (MKS), an
Ohio federally licensed firearm distributor.8 Subsequently,
MKS sold the weapon to Charles Brown, a federal gun
licensee.9 But the Beemiller-MKS-Brown chain was a series
of unusually close transactions. In fact, MKS was
Beemiller’s sole Hi-Point distributor,10 and Charles Brown
was MKS’s president.11 Williams alleged Brown bought HiPoint firearms from his own company, MKS, to retail at gun
shows.12 Williams also contended Brown was in daily

Buffalo News published The Damage Done series, investigating James Nigel
Bostic and proliferation of illegal weapons onto western New York streets).
6. See id.
7. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 336. Beemiller/Hi-Point manufacture and
market “tough, reliable, [and] affordable” carbines and handguns. See HI-POINT
FIREARMS, http://www.hi-pointfirearms.com/index.html (last visited July 13,
2013). Today, their products retail with local dealers in nearly every state. See
Dealer
Locator,
HI-POINT
FIREARMS,
http://www.hipointfirearms.com/dealer_locator/dealer_locator.html (last visited July 13,
2013).
8. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 336. Pledging a painless purchasing and
servicing experience, MKS distributes Hi-Point and Chiappa firearms and Tuff1
grips. MKS SUPPLY, http://www.mkssupply.com/ (last visited July 13, 2013).
9. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 336. Charles Brown is currently president of
MKS
Supply.
See
Contact,
MKS
SUPPLY,
http://www.mkssupply.com/contact_MKS_Supply/contact_MKS_Supply.html
(last visited July 13, 2013).
10. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 339; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3,
Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 952 N.Y.S.2d 333 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012) (No. CA
11-02092).
11. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 10, at 3.
12. Id.
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contact with Beemiller management as both a distributor
and retailer.13
Then, in October 2000, Brown sold a Beemiller Hi-Point
9mm pistol and eighty-six other handguns to Kimberly
Upshaw and James Nigel Bostic at an Ohio gun show. 14 For
years, Bostic ran one of the largest gun-trafficking
operations in western New York, providing approximately
250 inexpensive firearms to criminals in the greater Buffalo
area, Rochester, and New York City.15 Beemiller’s Hi-Point
9mm semi-automatic was his most frequent purchase. 16
Ultimately, Beemiller and MKS supplied 181 firearms to
Bostic.17
Capitalizing on Ohio’s less restrictive gun laws18 and the
anonymity of gun show purchases, Bostic and three women
bought firearms under false assertions Bostic was planning
on starting his own gun store.19 Though Bostic purchased a
handful of firearms in his own name, most of the weapons
trafficked to western New York were purchased in a series

13. Id.
14. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 339. Gun shows are the target of gun control
advocates’ ire because many shows allow private gun sales without buyer
background checks. See Dan Herbeck & Lou Michel, The Gun-Show Loophole:
Private Dealers Require No Background Check, BUFFALO NEWS, June 14, 2005,
at A5.
15. See Schulman, Michel & Herbeck, supra note 5.
16. See id. Bostic purchased Hi-Point handguns for approximately $89 each.
They retailed on western New York streets for nearly $300. See id.
17. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 10, at 6-7.
18. See Schulman, Michel & Herbeck, supra note 5. In 2011, the Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence released a scorecard quantifying gun law
strength on a state-to-state basis. Ohio ranked among the least restrictive,
while New York was among the most. Ohio’s ranking was due, in part, to its
lacking regulations and background checks for gun show purchases (an area
New York scored high in). See 2011 Brady Campaign State Scorecard,
BRADYCAMPAIGN.ORG,
http://bradycampaign.org/sites/default/files/2011%20Final%20state%20scoresA3
-2%20Sheet1.pdf.
19. See Schulman, supra note 3; Schulman, Michel & Herbeck, supra note 5.
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of illegal “straw purchases” by his three cohorts.20 The guns
were linked to several crimes in Buffalo before Caldwell
used one of Bostic’s Hi-Point 9mms to shoot Williams.21 For
their crimes, Caldwell and Bostic were sentenced to six- and
seven-year prison terms respectively.22 Hoping to recover for
his gunshot injuries, Daniel Williams sued Brown,
Beemiller, and MKS.23
II. 2003: THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS
ACT SAVES A GUN INDUSTRY UNDER FIRE
In 2003, the same year Daniel Williams was shot, the
firearms industry was under attack. The mass shooting at
Columbine High School in 1999 had enflamed the passions
of gun-control advocates nationwide,24 and firearm
manufacturers and distributors were taking the worst of
their lumps in the courtroom.25
The wave of lawsuits filed against firearm
manufacturers and distributors mirrored the extensive antitobacco litigation that put cigarette companies on the
defensive.26 Though tort lawsuits against tobacco companies
began more than fifty years ago, they gained a full head of
steam after plaintiff victories in the early 2000s.27 Anti-gun
20. See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 952 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (App. Div. 4th
Dep’t 2012), amended by 962 N.Y.S.2d 834 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013);
Schulman, Michel & Herbeck, supra note 5.
21. See Gun by Gun: Five Years of Damage Done by Weapons James Nigel
Bostic Bought from Ohio Gun Dealers, BUFFALO NEWS, June 12, 2005, at A8
[hereinafter Gun by Gun]; Schulman, Michel & Herbeck, supra note 5.
22. See Gun by Gun, supra note 21; Schulman, Michel & Herbeck, supra note
5.
23. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
24. See Allen Rostron, Lawyers, Guns, & Money: The Rise and Fall of Tort
Litigation Against the Firearms Industry, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 481, 481
(2006) (reviewing SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF
GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005)).
25. See id.
26. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Comparing Tobacco and Gun Litigation, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND
MASS TORTS 196, 215, 220-21 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
27. See id.
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lawsuits joined anti-tobacco litigation in a growing trend:
using the courtroom to advance public health goals like
combating gun violence and smoking.28
Many of the goals associated with the anti-gun
litigation matched the aims of the tobacco lawsuits.29
Extreme gun-control and anti-tobacco advocates hoped
extensive litigation might bankrupt manufacturers.30 More
realistic proponents aimed at forcing gun and tobacco
companies to make their products safer, reveal past
malevolent conduct, and assume the costs of injuries their
products caused.31
But while tobacco lawsuits were often class action
ventures,32 nearly all firearm lawsuits were brought by
either: (1) shooting victims seeking compensation for their
injuries; or (2) state and local governments trying to reduce
costs incurred fighting gun crimes.33 Gunshot victims and
their families sued firearm manufacturers directly under
negligence, public nuisance, and strict liability theories.34
Meanwhile, more than twenty-five municipalities—
including cities like Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles,
New Orleans, Philadelphia, New York, San Francisco, St.
Louis, and Washington D.C.—filed similar lawsuits.35

28. See id. at 198-02, 205.
29. See id. at 205-14.
30. See id. at 205-07.
31. See id. at 207, 209-10, 212, 214.
32. See id. at 216-17.
33. See Rostron, supra note 24, at 481-82.
34. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 304 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bryco
Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 641 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
35. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-124, at 11-12 (2005); see, e.g., City of New York v.
Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A.,
Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. Pa. 2000), aff’d, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir.
2002); District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., No. Civ. A. 0428-00, 2002
WL 31811717, at *1, *3, *5-6 (D.C. Super. Dec. 16, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005).
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In both circumstances, plaintiffs attempted to hold
firearm manufacturers, distributors, and retailers liable for
negligent behavior despite intervening actions by thirdparty criminals.36
The small firearms industry could not withstand the
crippling attack. As early as 2000, insurance companies
began dropping gun manufacturers’ coverage.37 A handful of
firearm companies were forced out of business.38 Then, in
2003, a measure of legislative relief offered the firearm
industry a glimmer of hope. Gun companies heartily backed
the first version of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act (PLCAA), a statute aimed at protecting gun
manufacturers and distributors from frivolous tort
litigation.39 But Democrats stalled the Act in the Senate,
tacking on assault weapons bans, beefed-up background
checks, and mandatory trigger locks.40
Two years after the first PLCAA failed, momentum
swung in the gun industry’s favor. Thirty-three states had
already taken steps to preclude baseless lawsuits from
being filed against gun manufacturers and distributors,41
but a handful of lawsuits lingered on court dockets, and the
industry’s legal bills were adding up. By 2005, firearms
companies had sunk more than $200 million into litigation
against gunshot victims and municipalities.42 For the U.S.
36. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003)
(plaintiffs attempting to hold handgun manufacturers and distributors liable for
a gunman’s shooting spree in a Jewish Community Center culminating in a
postal worker’s murder); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 401 F. Supp.
2d at 257-58 (city requesting various forms of injunctive relief against firearm
companies whose guns were used in crimes).
37. Sharon Walsh, Gun Industry Views Pact as Threat to Its Unity, WASH.
POST, Mar. 18, 2000, at A10.
38. See Bill Sammon, Gun Makers Halt Settlement Talks with Cities: Blame
White House’s ‘Politically Motivated’ Intervention, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2000,
at A1; Walsh, supra note 37.
39. See Brian DeBose, Bill Seeks to Protect Firearms Industry from Suits,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at A03.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Op-Ed., Gun Liability Control: The NRA Meets the Trial Bar at High
Noon, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2005, at A12.
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firearms industry, whose total profit in 1999 was $200
million, the legal bills were unmanageable.43 So, prodded by
gun lobbies like the National Rifle Association (NRA), the
second PLCAA cleared the Senate in 2005.44 Its expressed
purpose: to insulate firearm manufacturers, marketers,
distributors, and importers from liability when “the harm
[is] caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse
firearm products or ammunition products that function as
designed and intended.”45
The PLCAA provides grounds for immediately
dismissing “qualified civil liability actions” in Federal and
State courts.46 Qualified civil liability actions are lawsuits
brought “by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a
[firearm], or a trade association, for damages . . . or other
relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a
[firearm] by the person or a third party.”47
But the PLCAA exempts six different qualified civil
liability actions from automatic dismissal.48 The first
exemption permits litigation against gun transferors who
knowingly provide a firearm for some criminal activity
which directly injures the plaintiff.49 The second exemption
allows lawsuits against a gun seller for negligent
entrustment or negligence per se.50 The first two exceptions
are limited to the immediate firearm seller or transferor.
But the third PLCAA exception provides plaintiffs an

43. See H. Sterling Burnett, Firearms Cease-fire?, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2003, at A21.
44. See Adam Cohen, Why Is Congress Protecting the Gun Industry?, TIME
(Dec. 24, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/12/24/why-is-congress-protectingthe-gun-industry.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(5) (2006).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 7902(a) (2006). It also mandated dismissal of all pending
“qualified civil liability actions.” Id. § 7902(b).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2006).
48. See id. § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi).
49. See id. § 7903(5)(A)(i). Gun transferors violate federal firearm trafficking
laws when they convey a firearm knowing it will used in a crime of violence. 18
U.S.C. § 924(h) (2006).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii).
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opportunity to sue deep pockets—gun manufacturers,
distributors, and sellers.51
Dubbed “the predicate exception, the third exemption
permits claims against gun manufacturers, distributors,
and sellers who “knowingly violate[] a State or Federal
statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the
[firearm].”52 It also allows claims against manufacturers and
distributors who aid, abet, or conspire to complete illegal
firearm or ammunition sales. 53 For plaintiffs to recover, the
manufacturer or seller’s violation must proximately cause
the harm for which relief is sought.54 Clarifying the
exception, the PLCAA offers model “predicate statutes.”55
Despite the example statutes, courts became mired in a
difficult analysis determining whether the defendants’
alleged transgressions violated a statute “applicable” to the
sale or marketing of a firearm.56
Municipalities and private plaintiffs tried to invoke the
predicate exception by alleging the gun manufacturers and
distributors had violated state and local nuisance laws. 57
51. See id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). The fourth, fifth, and sixth exceptions permit
actions for breach of contract or warranty, faulty design or manufacture directly
causing plaintiff’s injuries, and certain lawsuits brought by the Attorney
General. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iv)-(vi).
52. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274,
1285-86 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I)-(II).
54. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
55. They include the defendant’s aiding or abetting a fraudulent gun transfer
or purchase and conveying or selling a gun to a person prohibited from owning a
firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I)-(II).
56. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 2009); City
of New York v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 399-04 (2d Cir. 2008); (“The
core of the question is what Congress meant by the term ‘applicable.’”); Smith &
Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary ex rel. Clay, 875 N.E.2d 422, 430-33 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007).
57. See Russ Sorensen, The Ninth Circuit Forecloses a Bullet Sized Hole in
the PLCAA in Ileto v. Glock, 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009), 35 S. ILL. U. L.J.
573, 577 (2011); see, e.g., Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1133; City of New York v. Beretta
U.S.A., Corp., 524 F.3d at 389; District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 940
A.2d 163, 167 (D.C. 2008); Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary ex rel. Clay,
875 N.E.2d at 424.
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But most courts refused to label nuisance laws “predicate
statutes” because the nuisance laws were not adequately
applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms.58 In one
notable exception, Indiana’s Court of Appeals broadly
interpreted the “applicable” portion of the predicate
exception and allowed the City of Gary’s lawsuit to continue
despite Smith and Wesson’s motion to dismiss.59 Though the
City of Gary case represents a different interpretation of the
predicate exception, it—and every other court dealing with
the predicate exception—failed to articulate a concrete
standard for what laws might be predicate statutes.60
The Ninth Circuit’s attempt at defining “predicate
statute” was cursory, precluding only general tort theories
like public nuisance from the predicate exception.61 The
Second Circuit’s effort didn't make the predicate exception
waters any clearer. After declining to find New York’s
public nuisance statute “applicable” to gun marketing or
sale, the Second Circuit suggested the predicate exception
required violation of “statutes (a) that expressly regulate
firearms, or (b) that courts have applied to the sale and
marketing of firearms; [or (c)] . . . that do not expressly
regulate firearms but that clearly can be said to implicate
the purchase and sale of firearms.”62 But in a dissenting
opinion, Judge Katzmann expressed concern that the
decision failed to define predicate statutes for future
courts.63
Without guidance, the only clear examples of predicate
statutes are those provided by the PLCAA.64 The statute
58. Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1137-38; City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 524
F.3d at 404.
59. See Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary ex rel. Clay, 875 N.E.2d at 43435. Public nuisance claims brought by private individuals receive different—and
often more favorable—treatment than those brought by government entities.
See Ingrid M. Evans & Allen Rostron, Litigating Against the Firearm Industry,
84 AM. JUR. Trials 109 § 21 (2013).
60. See Sorensen, supra note 57, at 592-93.
61. See Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1138; Sorensen, supra note 57, at 592.
62. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 524 F.3d at 404.
63. See id. at 406 (Katzmann, J., dissenting).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I)-(II) (2006).

2013]

CRACK IN THE FLOODGATES

979

allows qualified civil liability actions based on violations of
state or Federal record-keeping laws.65 It also permits
claims alleging firearms manufacturers or distributors
directly aided, abetted, or conspired to falsify information
relating to gun sales.66 But the PLCAA cites only one
specific Federal gun law as a predicate statute: 18 U.S.C. §
922, subsections (g) and (n).67 Subsection (g) makes it
unlawful for firearm distributors to knowingly sell guns to,
among others, fugitives, drug users, aliens, convicts
released after one year or more in jail, and persons
adjudicated mentally defective.68 Similarly, subsection (n)
makes it unlawful for any person indicted for a crime
punishable by one or more years in prison to receive or
convey a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce.69
Without a clear definition for “predicate statutes,” the
predicate exception remains a difficult requirement for
plaintiffs to satisfy. And the PLCAA became a nearlyimpervious shield barring most qualified civil liability
actions against gun manufacturers, distributors, and
sellers.
III. 2012: NEW YORK’S FOURTH DEPARTMENT IS AMONG THE
FIRST TO ALLOW A QUALIFIED CIVIL LIABILITY ACTION TO
SURVIVE THE PLCAA
But on October 5, 2012, the Supreme Court of New York
Appellate Division, Fourth Department became the first
post-PLCAA court to sustain a qualified civil liability action
since the City of Gary, Indiana’s lawsuit against Smith and

65. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring
records to be kept for importation, production, shipment, receipt, or sale of guns
during a period decided by the Attorney General); 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(a) (2012)
(demanding nearly all changes in a firearm’s disposition be documented on the
weapon’s transaction record).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I).
67. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(II).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006).
69. Id. § 922(n).
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Wesson.70 Daniel Williams’ complaint against Beemiller and
MKS was dismissed at the trial court level after the
firearms manufacturer and distributor moved to dismiss the
claim under the PLCAA.71 But on appeal, Williams’
attorneys72 argued the case fell within the PLCAA’s
predicate exception and was not automatically dismissible.73
They contended Beemiller and MKS knowingly
marketed and sold firearms to criminals.74 Williams also
claimed the defendants knowingly violated statutes
prohibiting straw purchases and sales to convicted felons. 75
The plaintiff gave several reasons why Beemiller and MKS
knew or should have known their sales to Bostic were
illegal: (1) bulk handgun purchases are common practice for
illegal gun traffickers; (2) repeat handgun purchases are
evidence an illegal gun trafficker is restocking his
inventory; (3) large cash firearm sales indicate illegal
trafficking; (4) “Saturday Night Specials” like Hi-Point 9mm
handguns are criminal favorites; (5) Hi-Point 9mms have no
collector value; and (6) Bostic and Upshaw’s actions were
obviously illegal straw purchases.76
The Fourth Department agreed with Williams and
overturned the trial court’s dismissal.77 Though the court
recognized Williams’ case fit the very definition of a
qualified civil liability action, it decided the lawsuit fell
within the PLCAA’s predicate exception.78 The Fourth
70. See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 952 N.Y.S.2d 333, 339 (App. Div. 4th
Dep’t 2012), amended by 962 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013); Caher,
supra note 3; Schulman, supra note 3.
71. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37.
72. Daniel Williams was represented at the Fourth Department by Connors
& Vilardo, LLP, Buffalo, NY and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence,
Washington, D.C. Id. at 335.
73. Id. at 337.
74. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 10, at 5-6.
75. See id. at 7-8.
76. See id.
77. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 337. The Honorable Erin M. Peradotto penned
the Fourth Department’s decision. Id. at 336.
78. Id.
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Department’s theory on the PLCAA and accomplice liability,
holding Beemiller and MKS liable for the criminal actions of
a third-party retailer and third-party buyer, may provide
future plaintiffs a better crack at firearm manufacturers
and distributors.79
A. The Fourth Department and the Predicate Exception
Before analyzing Williams’ case in light of the PLCAA,
the Fourth Department reflected on the traditional
standard for motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims.80 Courts
“accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and . . .
accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable
inference.”81 This standard would form the basis for the
Fourth Department’s decision to allow Williams’ case to
continue past dismissal.82 Further, it allowed the appellate
court to identify statutory violations in Williams’ complaint
though the plaintiff’s complaint did not specify any.83
Without detailing specific laws, Williams’ complaint
alleged Beemiller, MKS, and Brown “violated federal, state,
and local statutes, regulations, and ordinances by engaging
in illegal gun trafficking and illegally selling the Hi-Point
handgun.”84 The defendants argued Williams’ failure to
identify specific statutes precluded a finding under the
predicate exception.85 But the court decided it would not
require Williams to identify specific predicate statutes
violated by the defendants.86
79. See id. at 339.
80. See id. at 338.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id. New York General Municipal Law principles demand specific
pleadings. See N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 205-e (McKinney 2007).
86. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The defendants primarily relied on
General Municipal Law principals demanding specific pleading requirements.
See, e.g., MUNIC. § 205-e. But cases outside those arising under General
Municipal Law do not typically require such specificity. See Williams, 952
N.Y.S.2d at 338. In their brief to the Fourth Department, the plaintiffs
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Instead, the Fourth Department read several statutory
violations into Williams’ complaint, each a component of the
Gun Control Act of 1968.87 In 1968, Congress made a
concerted effort to regulate the passage of firearms through
interstate commerce.88 Today, many of the Act’s sections
regulate the purchase and transportation process.89 Each
violation recognized by the court was directly committed by
Brown, including: (1) failing to adequately record
identifying information from gun purchasers; (2)
transferring firearms on the buyer’s fraudulent
representations despite the seller knowing or having reason
to believe their falsehood; and (3) knowingly or negligently
conveying a firearm to a convicted felon.90
Despite being the first court to utilize the predicate
exception against a firearm manufacturer or distributor in
five years, the Fourth Department added little to clarify the
vague standard.91 The court found Williams sufficiently
alleged violations satisfying the predicate exception.92
But the court’s analysis of whether the specific
provisions violated were predicate statutes was brief. Each
firearm statute implicated by the Fourth Department was
part of the 1968 Gun Control Act.93 And the only statutes
deemed predicate statutes by the PLCAA are sections of the
1968 Gun Control Act.94 Thus, an in-depth analysis was not
necessary to decide whether portions of the same Act were
identified federal and state statutes allegedly violated by the defendants. See
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 10, at 17-18.
87. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39.
88. The 1968 Act’s passage was driven by high-profile assassination victims
like John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. See
William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
79, 80-83 (1999).
89. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-924, 926, 926A (2006).
90. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39. The specific statutes violated were
18 U.S.C. §§ 923(g), 922(b), 922(m), and 922(d)(1).
91. See id. at 337-39.
92. See id.
93. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-923; Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39.
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(II) (2006).
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predicate statutes.95 Instead, the court safely assumed each
federal gun law was applicable to the sale and/or marketing
of firearms.96
However, the Fourth Department wasn’t content in
deciding only the federal gun laws were predicate statutes.
The court amended its decision on February 1, 2013, and
tacked on one sentence allowing Williams’ public nuisance
claim to survive the PLCAA.97 Citing Johnson v. Bryco Arms
and City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry and Pawn, Inc., the
Fourth Department concluded Williams had adequately
brought a public nuisance claim against Beemiller and
MKS.98 But the cursory rationale for allowing Williams’
public nuisance claim rests on shaky authority. The
decisions cited by the Fourth Department to support public
nuisance statutes being “applicable” to firearm sales or
marketing are not entirely convincing since: (1) Johnson v.
Bryco Arms was decided in 2004,99 before the PLCAA’s
enactment;100 and (2) City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry and
Pawn, Inc. was a 2007 district court case101 decided before
the Second Circuit issued its 2008 opinion barring public
nuisance laws from being predicate statutes.102

95. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39. But see Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565
F.3d 1126, 1132-38 (9th Cir. 2009); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp.,
524 F.3d 384, 399-04 (2d Cir. 2008); District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A.,
Corp., 940 A.2d 163, 169-72 (D.C. 2008); Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary
ex rel. Clay, 875 N.E.2d 422, 431-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
96. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39.
97. See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc. 962 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th
Dep’t 2013).
98. See id.
99. Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 304 F. Supp. 2d 383, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2006).
101. City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296, 296
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
102. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 399-400 (2d Cir
2008). In fact, a judicial order was issued in the A-1 Jewelry & Pawn case after
the Second Circuit’s decision. The new order acknowledged that general state
laws (like public nuisance) were not predicate statutes. See City of New York v.
A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 130, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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Though the Fourth Department’s decision divorced
itself from generally accepted principles of public nuisance
and the predicate exception, its decision in Williams does
little to illuminate the current predicate exception standard.
The elusive definition remains—a law applicable to gun
sales or marketing whose violation proximately causes
harm for which relief is sought—without any clarification of
“applicable.”103 The Second Circuit hinted at a less-strict
approach, but no clear standard has emerged to determine
whether a law or regulation indirectly concerning the gun
industry may serve as a predicate statute.104
B. The Fourth Department, the PLCAA, and Accomplice
Liability
The Fourth Department had little trouble finding
Charles Brown’s statutory violations triggered the predicate
exception. And since Brown was, in effect, MKS,
determining the distributor’s complicity in the violation was
not a stretch.105 But Beemiller’s role in the gun-selling
scheme was more attenuated.106 Still, the Fourth
Department decided Williams had sufficiently established
both Beemiller and MKS’s complicity in the violations.107
Wielding accomplice liability to capture a gun
manufacture in litigation is nearly an unprecedented leap.
Only one line of cases ties manufacturers and distributors

103. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (2006).
104. See City of New York, 524 F.3d at 404 (acknowledging a law indirectly
regulating the gun industry but directly implicating firearm sales or marketing
might be a predicate statute).
105. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 10, at 3.
106. See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 952 N.Y.S.2d 333, 339 (App. Div. 4th
Dep’t 2012), amended by 962 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013).
107. See id. Gun control advocates argue firearm manufacturers perversely
promote illegal gun sales and trafficking by ignoring problems like corrupt
dealers, straw purchases, high-volume sales, gun shows without background
checks, superficial security measures, and unsafe weapon designs. See LEGAL
ACTION PROJECT, BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, SMOKING GUNS:
EXPOSING THE GUN INDUSTRY’S COMPLICITY IN THE ILLEGAL GUN MARKET 2-16
(2003).
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to firearm retailers under an accomplice liability theory.108
In City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson (some stages
of the litigation proceeding as Smith & Wesson v. City of
Gary ex rel. Clay), the Supreme Court of Indiana allowed
the municipality’s case to continue past a motion for
dismissal after it found gun manufacturers and
distributors—including Beemiller, who was a named
defendant in the Indiana case—were accomplices to the
violation, though they had not directly violated a firearm
statute.109
But the City of Gary line of cases is an outlier on the
spectrum of firearm lawsuits, and it directly opposes Ninth
Circuit and Second Circuit decisions on whether nuisance
laws comport with the predicate exception.110 For five years,
City of Gary was the only case employing accomplice
liability in a PLCAA motion for dismissal.111 Tellingly, the
Fourth Department cited the City of Gary case for general
PLCAA principles—not for the meat of its predicate
exception or accomplice liability analyses.112
Unaided by significant case law, the Fourth
Department accepted Williams’ allegations that Beemiller
and MKS were accomplices to Brown’s statutory
violations.113 The court only cited one Sixth Circuit decision
to support its theory on accomplice liability.114 The decision,
United States v. Carney, was a criminal case decided in
2004, one year before the PLCAA’s enactment.115 The
Carney court found two firearm dealers had aided and
108. See City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222,
1235 (Ind. 2003).
109. See id.; see also Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary ex rel. Clay, 875
N.E.2d 422, 423-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
110. See Sorensen, supra note 57, at 583, 593.
111. Williams v. Beemiller became the second in October, 2012. See Williams,
952 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
112. See id. at 337-39.
113. Id. at 339.
114. See id. (citing United States v. Carney, 387 F.3d 436, 446-47 (6th Cir.
2004)).
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2006); Carney, 387 F.3d at 441-42.
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abetted fraudulent and illegal gun purchases, making them
accomplices to criminal actions.116
The distinctions between Beemiller and MKS, and the
Carney defendants are striking.117 First, the defendants in
Carney faced criminal charges.118 Beemiller and MKS are in
danger of being found civilly liable for Daniel Williams’
injuries.119 Second, as dealers, the Carney defendants were
directly involved in statutory violations committed by third
parties.120 In the Williams case, Brown—a federally licensed
gun dealer—played the same role.121 But Brown’s company,
MKS, was one step removed from Bostic and the illegal
purchases.122 Similarly, Beemiller, the manufacturer, was
even further removed from Brown’s statutory violations.123
Williams argued, and the court agreed, that Beemiller and
MKS made themselves accomplices to Brown’s statutory
violations when they learned 13,000 of their guns were used
to commit crimes.124 Other persuasive factors included
Brown’s employment with MKS and the distributor’s
position as “sole marketer and distributor of Hi-Point
firearms.”125 But beyond learning their guns were frequently
used in crimes, the only link establishing Beemiller’s
complicity in the statutory violations was daily phone calls
between Brown and the manufacturer.126
116. See Carney, 387 F.3d at 441, 446.
117. Evidencing the unprecedented nature of the Fourth Department’s
decision, the court chose a criminal case decided before the PLCAA’s enactment
to aid its decision in a civil case concerning a motion to dismiss under the
PLCAA.
118. Carney, 387 F.3d at 441.
119. Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
120. See Carney, 387 F.3d at 442 (detailing the defendant’s repeated sales to a
convicted felon through straw purchasers).
121. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (chronicling Bostic and his cohorts’
straw purchases from Brown at Ohio gun shows).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 339.
125. Id.
126. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 10, at 3, 5.
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The Fourth Department’s accomplice liability reaches
substantially farther than Carney’s, but does the PLCAA
leave gun manufacturers and distributors vulnerable to
accomplice liability? The answer is not as clean as the
Fourth Department’s analysis.
Title 18 of the United States Code codifies various
federal criminal laws,127 and chapter 44 is entirely devoted
to gun crimes including those violated by Brown and
Bostic.128 A defendant is an accomplice to a federal criminal
law when he “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures [the crime’s] commission.”129 However, courts have
not universally found chapter 44 laws comporting with
accomplice liability.130 And even if Beemiller and MKS could
be accomplices to Brown’s chapter 44 violations, claims
against the manufacturer and distributor may still be
dismissible under the PLCAA.
Broadly, the PLCAA insulates manufacturers,
marketers, distributers, importers, and sellers from liability
when third parties criminally misuse their firearms.131 It
accomplishes its purpose by subjecting qualified civil
liability actions to immediate dismissal.132 A qualified civil
liability action is brought against firearm manufacturers or
distributors for damages caused by criminal action by a
person or third party.133 For the PLCAA, person means “any
individual, corporation, company, association . . . or any
other entity.”134 The definition does not exclude gun retailers
who sell firearms on behalf of manufacturers and
distributors.135 So, it would seem manufacturers and
127. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2-2725(2006).
128. See id. §§ 921-931.
129. Id. § 2 (punishing accomplices as principals); United States v. Carney,
387 F.3d 436, 446 (6th Cir. 2004).
130. See United States v. Dedrick, 665 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (W.D.N.C. 2009)
(referencing United States v. Wegg, 919 F. Supp. 898, 907-08 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (2006).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 7902(a)-(b) (2006).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2006).
134. Id. § 7903(3).
135. See id.
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distributors might be insulated from immunity when
retailers unlawfully use or sell their firearms.
As described above, the predicate exception allows
qualified civil liability actions to proceed when the
defendant has knowingly violated a predicate statute, and
the violation proximately caused the harm for which the
plaintiff is trying to recover.136 If plaintiffs can show
defendants aided, abetted, or conspired with any person to
make a false or fraudulent purchase of a firearm, the
predicate exception is triggered.137 But the Fourth
Department’s accomplice liability theory goes beyond the
illegal purchase. It captures manufacturers and
distributors, parties who may not have been present at—or
have knowledge of—the sale or conveyance.
And even if they are accomplices, complicity does not
automatically establish liability. Firearm manufacturers
and distributors are not liable for injuries caused by
negligent sales or marketing unless they: (1) proximately
cause the plaintiff’s injuries; and (2) have knowledge (or can
be reasonably expected to have knowledge) of the retailer’s
malfeasance.138
First, proximate causation limits civil liability, but
there may be multiple proximate causes of the same
injury.139 Further, negligence of an intervening party does
not necessarily insulate a prior actor’s negligence from
liability.140 Therefore, the proximate cause element may be
satisfied even in accomplice liability cases. The Fourth
Department had little trouble deciding Williams adequately
showed Brown, MKS, and Beemiller proximately caused his
injury.141
136. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
137. See id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I).
138. See id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010).

OF

TORTS: LIABILITY

FOR

PHYSICAL

AND

140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965).
141. The Fourth Department added a proximate causation analysis in its
amended opinion. It decided the criminal shooting did not automatically sever
the chain of causation, leaving the question of whether Beemiller and MKS had
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Second, plaintiffs must also adequately allege each
defendant “knowingly violated a State or Federal statute
applicable to the sale or marketing of the product.”142 In
Williams, the Fourth Department found Brown had
knowingly violated several predicate statutes.143 Then, it
decided Beemiller and MKS knew or should have known
about Brown’s violations.144 If the Fourth Department’s
decision to hold Beemiller and MKS liable arose from the
portion of the predicate exception allowing lawsuits against
defendants who aid or abet fraudulent purchases, it
demanded little evidence.145 Brown’s employment at MKS
provided a sufficient link to capture the distributor, but the
best evidence Williams offered against Beemiller was the
company’s daily contact with MKS/Brown.146 Neither the
Fourth Department’s decision, nor the plaintiff’s brief
provided evidence the manufacturer directly oversaw any of
Brown’s transactions.147
Without Beemiller or MKS’s direct violation of a
predicate statute, the Fourth Department needed to
categorize the companies as accomplices to keep them in the
litigation. But perhaps such a novel approach warrants
more elaborate justification.148 The rocky framework for
marrying accomplice liability and the PLCAA is exacerbated
by the PLCAA’s very purpose—protecting firearm
manufacturers and distributors when a third party (like a
retailer) misuses their products.149 Though the Fourth
proximately caused Williams’ injuries to a future jury. See Williams v.
Beemiller, Inc., 962 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
143. See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 952 N.Y.S.2d 333, 338-39 (App. Div. 4th
Dep’t 2012), amended by 962 N.Y.S.2d 834 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013).
144. See id. at 339.
145. Note: the Fourth Department did not cite the aiding and abetting portion
of the PLCAA in regards to Beemiller and MKS. See id.
146. See id.; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 10, at 3.
147. See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 339; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra
note 10, at 3.
148. The Fourth Department limited its accomplice analysis to one paragraph.
See Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
149. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 7901(b)(1) (2006).
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Department’s decision is innovative, it will likely demand
more extensive review by future courts presiding over
PLCAA motions to dismiss.
IV. THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT, WILLIAMS V. BEEMILLER, AND
THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL
Due to the timing of the Williams decision, the Fourth
Department’s ruling could help reinvigorate public-healthmotivated litigation against the gun industry. Gun violence
has not decreased in the ten years since municipalities and
gunshot victims first attempted to take down the firearm
industry in the courtroom.150 In 2004, one year before the
PLCAA’s enactment, 29,569 people were killed by
firearms.151 Six years later, in 2010, 31,672 people suffered
the same fate.152 For years, gun-control advocates have
lobbied legislatures,
proliferated
propaganda,
and
encouraged lawsuits hoping to reduce the number of deaths
from firearms.153 The opposing side on this hot-button issue
has been equally aggressive, rallying behind the NRA and

150. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Web-Based Injury Statistics
Query & Reporting System (WISQARS) Fatal Injury Reports, 1999-2010, for
National, Regional, and States (Restricted), NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION
&
CONTROL
(last
updated
Feb.
19,
2013),
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/dataRestriction_inj.html (Agree to data use
restrictions; under “Report Options,” select “All Intents”; under “Mechanism of
Injury,” select "Firearm"; under “Year(s) of Report”, select “1999”; click “Submit
Request”; repeat process, increasing the year each time until year 2010).
151. See id. (the data includes accidental shootings and those killed by police
in emergency response).
152. See id. Though the total number of gun-caused deaths rose by nearly
2,000, when measured against the population increase, the overall rate only
marginally increased. Gun violence is heavily concentrated in certain
demographic groups; e.g., black males ages fifteen to twenty-four. See Julie
Samia Mair, Stephen Teret & Shannon Frattaroli, A Public Health Perspective
on Gun Violence Prevention, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 39, 44-46 (Timothy D. Lytton ed.,
2005).
153. See Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won't
Work, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN
CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 225, 225 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
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the Second Amendment.154 Gun-control advocates’ aims are
simple. They point to three common areas deserving
improved regulation: design, sale, and possession.155
Proposed design regulations often include additional
security measures like trigger locks, chamber indicators,
and personalized safeties.156 But the most commonly
suggested regulations affect gun sales at the retail level.
Some gun-control advocates support banning firearms
disproportionately used in crime, and others promote
restrictions on the number of guns that can be bought in a
single purchase.157 More invasive regulations have been
suggested to monitor firearm sales.158 Gun-control advocates
believe forcing firearm manufacturers to take responsibility
for their weapons through the chain of sale might encourage
them to micromanage retailers, reducing irresponsible
selling.159
Of the three commonly suggested modes of regulation,
gun-owner behavior is the most difficult to affect. Safe
ownership not only includes learning the capabilities and
dangers of each firearm, but it also demands secure storage
to prevent children, criminals, and untrained adults from
accessing guns.160
The need to prevent guns from falling into the wrong
hands has been tragically reinforced within the last year.
Shootings at a movie theater, shopping mall, and primary
school have thrust mental health and gun ownership issues
together as federal and state governments scramble to
propose new legislation and regulation on who may own and

154. See Paul Nowell, NRA Vows 2nd Amendment Celebration, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 20, 2000, available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com (search “NRA
Vows 2nd Amendment Celebration”; click the first link titled “NRA Vows 2nd
Amendment Celebration-Associated Press”).
155. See Mair, Teret & Frattaroli, supra note 152, at 50-61.
156. See id. at 50-51.
157. See id. at 53-54.
158. See id. at 56.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 56-57.
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buy firearms.161 On January 15, 2013, New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo signed into law the nation’s strictest gun
control legislation.162 Little over one month after the mass
shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, President
Barack Obama briefed the press on a sweeping set of
proposed regulations aimed at the gun industry.163
An avalanche of control sentiment has some legislation
moving quickly.164 But in the past, legislative failures slowed
gun-control progress.165 For many advocates, litigation
against the firearm industry presented a more effective
route to promote regulation.166 Holding gun companies liable
as accomplices when their products are misused or
criminally used would force them to take greater
responsibility for their retailers and consumers. Common
issues in the future might be: When is a firearm
manufacturer/distributor/retailer liable for a person with
mental health problems using their weapon to commit a
violent crime? Must they know the person has mental
health issues? Should they be expected to know a buyer has
a history of mental health concerns?
Perhaps Congress and/or fifty state legislatures will
enact the far-reaching reforms gun-control advocates are
calling for. But any new law will undoubtedly face
vociferous objection from the NRA, other gun lobbies, and
161. See Aaron C. Davis & Michael Laris, Mental Health Clouding Gun Effort:
O'Malley Fears Tougher Policy Could Lead People to Avoid Treatment, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 2013, at A1.
162. See Laura Nahmias, Cuomo Signs Gun Laws, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2013,
at A15.
163. See Jackie Kucinich & Aamer Madhani, Obama Presses Broad Gun Plan:
Controls Certain to Provoke NRA’s Strong Opposition, USA TODAY, Jan. 16,
2013, at 1A.
164. Gun Control: The Battle Begins, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2013, at 30.
Though early in its existence, the gun-control fervor after the most recent highprofile shootings is of an unparalleled intensity compared to other mass acts of
violence. See, e.g., Edward Epstein & Carla Marinucci, Virginia Tech Massacre;
Gun Control: Democrats, Eyes on Majority, Apt to Go Slow on Restrictions, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 18, 2007, at A8.
165. See Schuck, supra note 153, at 225.
166. See id.
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Senators and Representatives sensitive to gun rights.167 If
progress slows, litigants might look to the Fourth
Department’s decision in Williams v. Beemiller as a means
to reopen the portal to legal action against the gun industry.
However, it must be recognized that Williams v.
Beemiller is a state appellate court decision carrying little
precedential value outside New York. Still, the decision
might inspire potential plaintiffs and attorneys to seek
creative ways around the PLCAA. And if more courts are
willing to hold manufacturers and distributors liable as
accomplices to retailer’s illegal sales, gun-control advocates
will have promising litigation opportunities.
Many guns used in violent crimes are trafficked by
dealers engaging in a variety of illegal sales like the straw
purchases made for James Nigel Bostic.168 Straw purchases
present an ongoing problem for law enforcement
nationwide.169 And if courts decide the PLCAA does not
insulate manufacturers and distributors from liability when
their retailers violate federal and state gun-sale laws, many
will face lawsuits from gunshot victims. Under the Fourth
Department’s analysis, gun manufacturers and distributors
will be on notice of their responsibility for their dealers if
their firearms are frequently used in crimes.170 Thirteen
thousand Hi-Point guns used in crimes was enough for the
167. See Laura Meckler, Peter Nicholas & Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama’s
Gun Curbs Face a Slog in Congress: Divisions Among Democrats, Opposition by
House GOP Pose Hurdles to Many Proposals; NRA Sees Areas for Cooperation,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2013, at A4. One NRA webpage bears a rallying cry “Stand
and Fight.” See NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, http://www.nrastandandfight.com (last
visited June 9, 2013). Fight against what? Likely any effort at additional gun
regulation. See, e.g., First State Salvo on Gun Control Fired in N.Y., NAT’L RIFLE
ASS’N INST. LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/newsissues/articles/2013/1/first-state-salvo-on-gun-control-fired-in-ny.aspx.
168. Julius Wachtel, Sources of Crime Guns in Los Angeles, California, 21
POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT., 220, 221-23 (1998).
169. See, e.g., Curbing Straw Sales: Philadelphia Gun Purchase Case Gives
Hope, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 6, 2009, at B6; Judy Harrison, Tracing
Traffickers: Officials Say the Use of ‘Straw Buyers,’ Particularly Women, Is a
Part of a Growing Crime Trend, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009, at A1.
170. See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 952 N.Y.S.2d 333, 339 (App. Div. 4th
Dep’t 2012), amended by 962 N.Y.S.2d 834 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013).
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Fourth Department.171 And some of the largest gun
manufacturers—like Smith & Wesson, Ruger, and
Mossberg—design and produce firearms commonly used by
criminals.172
Time will tell how the Fourth Department’s decision in
Williams v. Beemiller will affect firearm litigation and the
PLCAA. But if the winds of change continue to favor greater
gun regulation, it will not be surprising to see litigation
against the firearms industry reborn. In fact, little over one
month after the Fourth Department allowed Daniel
Williams’ case to proceed past a PLCAA challenge, a
handful of Missouri plaintiffs cited the case in their own
effort to avoid PLCAA dismissal.173
In April 2007, David W. Lodgson offered a stolen credit
card to purchase ammunition and magazines from Shawnee
Gun Shop.174 Lodgson used the ammunition to kill the
Missouri plaintiffs’ family members in a deadly shopping
center shooting.175 The Missouri plaintiffs sued Shawnee
Gun Shop and used Williams v. Beemiller in an attempt to
fit their case into one of the PLCAA’s exceptions to
dismissible qualified civil liability actions.176
CONCLUSION: PRESSING THE FLOODGATES
The Fourth Department’s decision in Williams v.
Beemiller doesn't open the gun companies up to the
171. Id.
172. See Elaine Shannon, America’s Most Wanted Guns, TIME, July 12, 2002,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,320383,00.html (last visited
July 13, 2013).
173. See Appellants’ Amended Brief at 20-21, Noble v. Shawnee Gun Shop,
Inc., Nos. 0916-CV01331-01 and 0816-CV38499-01, (Mo. Ct. App. filed Dec. 14,
2012).
174. Id. at 2.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 20-21. The plaintiffs seem to have mistakenly interpreted the
Fourth Department's decision as finding for Williams on negligent entrustment
grounds. See id. at 21. In its responding brief, Shawnee Gun Shop noted the
Missouri plaintiffs’ apparent confusion. See Respondent’s Brief at 26-27, Noble
v. Shawnee Gun Shop, Inc., Nos. 0916-CV01331-01 and 0816-CV38499-01 (Mo.
Ct. App. filed Jan. 13, 2013).
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extensive litigation that threatened to bankrupt the firearm
industry a decade ago. The facts behind the case are too
narrow to be generally applied.177 Charles Brown’s close
relationship with MKS Supply and Beemiller is not common
amongst firearm manufacturers, distributors, and
retailers.178 But it helped the Fourth Department deploy its
theory on accomplice liability. Further, the PLCAA still
presents a high hurdle for future firearm plaintiffs to
overcome. But if the PLCAA is a floodgate holding back a
tide of unchecked firearm litigation, Williams v. Beemiller
represents a crack in the dam. Future litigants may rely
on—or be inspired by—Williams v. Beemiller in efforts to
circumvent PLCAA dismissal.

177. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Are Gun Manufacturers Under Renewed
Assault?,
LIBRARY
OF
LAW
&
LIBERTY
(Oct.
18,
2012),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2012/10/18/are-gun-makers-under-renewedassault/.
178. Id.; see Williams v. Beemiller, 952 N.Y.S.2d 333, 339 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t
2012), amended by 962 N.Y.S.2d 834 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013).

